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HOW LAMBIS AND CSLI LITIGATION MANDATE 
WARRANTS FOR CELL-SITE SIMULATOR USAGE IN NEW 
YORK  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, various federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
have enjoyed the growth and development of technology in aiding their 
efforts to combat crime. Until recently, not much information had been 
available regarding the use, or existence, of cell-site simulators. Cell-site 
simulators have been around for at least fifteen years,1 and they operate by 
mimicking cell phone towers.2 Known also by their popular brand name, 
Stingray, cell-site simulators have the capability to extract information such 
as location and call records by tricking a nearby cell phone to connect to 
them instead of cell towers.3  
Perhaps as a result of the petitions of various civil liberty groups and 
privacy advocates, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) issued guidance policies on their use of cell-site 
simulators. These policies generally require a warrant to be obtained if 
probable cause exists, unless the circumstances are exigent or exceptional.4 
On the state level, however, the extent of available information and issued 
guidance varies widely. California’s Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act requires a warrant before state law enforcement can obtain data through 
cell-site simulators and other means, 5  while the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) has been sued by the New York Civil Liberties Union 
(NYCLU) after it refused to reveal information on its use of cell-site 
simulators.6  
As cell phones continue to play a larger and vital role in the everyday 
lives of Americans, it is troubling that enforcement agencies possess an 
unhindered ability to gather personal—and mostly irrelevant—information 
                                                
1.  Sam Biddle, Long-Secret Stingray Manuals Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones, THE 
INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2016, 1:33 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingray-
manuals-detail-how-police-can-spy-on-phones/.  
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY DIRECTIVE 047-02 (2015), 
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/15-3959-S2-DHS-Signed-Policy-Directive-
047-02-Use-of-Cell-Site-Simulator-Tech.pdf; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download. 
5.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (West 2016); see infra Section V.a. 
6.  New York Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.P.D., Docket No. 100788/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 19, 2016). 
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from anyone within the range of cell-site simulators without a warrant. This 
Note will focus on how cell-site simulators have been used in New York, 
and how New York’s state and local law enforcement agencies must take 
note of United States v. Lambis7 and appropriately modify or create (as it is 
unknown whether they even have such policy)8 their policies to require 
warrants.  
Part II of this Note will discuss the available information on cell-site 
simulators with specific regard to use in New York. Part III will discuss 
legal precedent regarding cell-site simulators and cell site location 
information (CSLI), comparing the two types of surveillance and analyzing 
why CSLI precedent points to the necessity of a warrant for cell-site 
simulators. Part IV will discuss Lambis in detail and its potential impact on 
cell-site simulators. Part V will discuss what a proposed legislative 
enactment on cell-site simulators should address and also discuss 
California’s relevant statute briefly as an example. Lastly, Part VI will 
conclude this Note by discussing past and current efforts to require warrants 
for cell-site simulator use, why law enforcement officials should modify 
their policy to require warrants, and how state legislatures could, 
alternatively, take anticipatory action and modify statutes to require 
warrants for such devices.  
I. THE FRIGHTENING CAPABILITY OF CELL-SITE SIMULATORS TO OBTAIN 
VARIOUS INFORMATION FROM CELL PHONES WITHIN THEIR RANGE 
Much of the information available on cell-site simulators stems from 
federal agencies and their disclosures. Based on available information,9 it 
appears that the state and local use of such simulators are similar. 10 
According to the Department of Justice, cell-site simulators force cell 
phones, within a certain range, to connect to them rather than the cell towers, 
and cause the phones to give up the phone and electronic serial numbers that 
are assigned by the manufacturers.11 The DOJ emphasized in its policy that 
data obtained through cell-site simulators are similar to those from pen 
                                                
7.  197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
8.  Stingrays, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/stingrays (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
9.  See infra Section II.a. (discussing efforts by federal agencies to mandate that state and 
local agencies remain in total secrecy regarding their use of cell-site simulators).  
10.  See generally Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, 
and Less Than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the 
Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 142 (2013). 
11.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW 
FORMS (June 2005), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf. 
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registers,12 in that they only provide records such as phone numbers and call 
logs, and do not disclose emails, texts, the user’s name, or the address.13 
However, state and local law enforcement agencies, especially those in New 
York, have refused to release in detail what type of information they collect, 
what they retain, and what is ultimately destroyed.14  
The DOJ’s policy only covers federal agencies and fails to provide 
insight on how the devices are used on the state and local level,15 where the 
simulators are used extensively and where the devices are often borrowed 
from the federal agencies.16 Given that cell-site simulators have the full 
capacity to obtain a phone’s location history, track its location through GPS, 
and also obtain contents of calls, texts, and history of visited websites,17 the 
lack of transparency by state and local agencies is deeply concerning.  
A. Usage of Cell-Site Simulators in New York 
Prior to discussing how the cell-site simulators have been used in New 
York, it must be noted that these devices are not cheap. As of May 2015, 
the New York state police had spent over $640,000 on cell-site simulators.18 
Some portions of that amount were spent on upgrading the devices, 
including the purchase of an amplifier that could augment their surveillance 
capabilities.19  
While spending inordinate amounts of money purchasing and upgrading 
the cell-site simulators, when confronted with a Freedom of Information 
Law request, the New York State Police responded that it did not have any 
                                                
12.  A pen register is “[a]n electronic device that tracks and records all the numbers dialed from 
a particular telephone line, as well as all the routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted 
by other means of electronic communications.” Pen Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
13.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. DHS’s policy also contains very similar language. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 4.  
14.  See, e.g., NYCLU, supra note 8 (discussing how Rochester Police Department’s policy in 
New York suggests that it “keeps the records they intentionally acquired through Stingray use for a 
minimum of ten years,” although they do “destroy or seal the material they acquire inadvertently”).  
15.  The DHS’s policy does include a section on “State and Local Partners,” but its vague 
language does not appear to be binding on state and local enforcement agencies, especially since it is 
unclear which circumstances qualify. “This policy applies to all instances in which [DHS] use[s] cell-
site simulators in support of other federal agencies and/or state and local law enforcement agencies.” 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 4. 
16.  Kim Zetter, New Bill Would Force Cops to Get Stingray Warrants, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2015, 
3:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/new-bill-would-force-cops-to-get-warrants-before-spying-
with-stingrays/.  
17.  Pell & Soghoian, supra note 10, at 144–46. 
18.  NYCLU, supra note 8.  
19.  Id.  
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records on numbers of investigations during which the equipment was used 
or any applications to court to request the use of cell-site simulators.20 
However, there is evidence of the FBI working with state and local police 
departments to maintain secrecy on use of the devices, subjecting the 
departments to nondisclosure agreements. 21  Notably, the Erie County 
Sheriff’s Office entered into a confidentiality agreement with the FBI.22 
This agreement required the Sheriff’s Office to maintain total secrecy about 
the use of cell-site simulators, including in court filings and when 
responding to court orders, absent explicit written consent by the FBI.23 
Furthermore, the Office was required to pursue dismissal of a criminal 
prosecution rather than compromising the disclosure of any information 
concerning the devices and their use.24  
The usage of cell-site simulators is not uncommon. The NYPD used the 
devices in over 1,000 cases between 2008 and 2015, and the seriousness of 
the alleged crimes ranges from homicide to identity theft.25 New York state 
and local police continue to use cell-site simulators and spend significant 
amounts of money to maintain them, without being subject to any 
constraints or regulations. They continue to use these devices while refusing 
to disclose any information.26 Thus, it is unsurprising that privacy advocates 
have probed the practice with increased scrutiny in recent years.27 
B. Efforts by the New York Civil Liberties Union and Legislative Attempts 
to Require Warrants Have Been Unsuccessful 
In 2015, two bills were introduced to the New York legislature to require 
either a court order or a warrant before utilizing cell-site simulators. S04914, 
a bill introduced in the New York Senate in 2015, sought to include “mobile 
phone surveillance systems” within the New York pen register statute that 
                                                
20.  Id. 
21.  STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., REP. ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATION TECHS: PRIVACY CONCERNS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 31–32 (2016).  
22.  NYCLU, supra note 8. 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id.  
25.  Joseph Goldstein, New York Police Are Using Covert Cellphone Trackers, Civil Liberties 
Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/new-york-
police-dept-cellphone-tracking-stingrays.html?_r=0.  
26.  See, e.g., NYCLU and Activists File Lawsuit After NYPD Refuses to Respond to Records 
Requests About Anti-Protest Activities, NYCLU (May 23, 2017), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-
releases/nyclu-and-activists-file-lawsuit-after-nypd-refuses-respond-records-requests-about. 
27.  See, e.g., NYCLU, supra note 8.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/9
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granted the court to issue orders.28 Another bill proposed including cell-site 
simulators specifically in the eavesdropping statute, which would require a 
warrant before use. 29  Neither bill proceeded beyond being sent to a 
committee for approval.30  
In 2016, a number of bills were introduced that would require warrants 
for cell-site simulators unless the agency had the explicit permission of the 
owner or authorized user of the electronic device.31 Named the New York 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, it advanced past the codes 
committee and was sent to the rules committee for approval in June 2016, 
but it did not proceed beyond that.32 It is unclear why the bills have not 
garnered enough support to continue through the process and eventually 
become law, especially given that the bills gained support from prominent 
companies and organizations such as Google and The Legal Aid Society.33  
In March 2017, two members of the New York City Council introduced 
the Public Oversight of Surveillance Act (POST Act) that would require the 
NYPD to disclose basic information on the surveillance tools they use, 
including cell-site simulators.34 Specifically, it would require the NYPD to 
“issue a surveillance impact and use policy about these technologies,” 
which will be open for comments and the final version will be provided to 
the Council, the Mayor, and be posted on the NYPD’s website.35 After a 
committee hearing held on June 14, 2017, the bill was “laid over,” 36 
indicating that no votes or further actions were taken.37 Since Mayor Bill 
De Blasio has publicly opposed it, this means that the bill must gain the 
                                                
28.  S. 4914, 2015–16 Leg. (N.Y. 2015). 
29.  A.B. 8055, 2015–16 Leg. (N.Y. 2015).  
30.  Senate Bill S4914A, THE NEW YORK SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/S4914/amendment/A (last visited Feb. 13, 2017); 
Assembly Bill A8055, THE NEW YORK SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/A8055 (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).  
31.  Mike Maharrey, NY Electronic Communications Privacy Act Passed, ACTIVIST POST (June 
17, 2016), http://www.activistpost.com/2016/06/ny-electronic-communications-privacy-act-
passed.html. 
32.  Id.  
33.  Protect Your Privacy: Help Pass the New York State Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/ecpa. (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
34.  Int. No. 1482, 2017–18 Leg. (N.Y. 2017).  
35.  Summary of Int. 1482, THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (2017), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2972217&GUID=0D8289B8-5F08-4E6F-
A0D1-2120EF7A0DCA&Options=ID%7C&Search=.  
36.  Meeting Minutes, THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (June. 14, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=M&ID=547508&GUID=B95086F9-B596-40F1-A752-
3C5E427577B1.  
37.  Featured Legislation: Task Force on Police Body Cameras, NYC COUNCILMATIC, 
https://nyc.councilmatic.org.  
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support of at least two-thirds of the Council, or 34 votes, to override his veto, 
if the vote ever occurs.38  
II. HOW THE UNRESTRICTED USAGE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATORS 
VIOLATES FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Traditionally, legal issues concerning privacy have been scrutinized 
under well-established tests such as the reasonable expectation of privacy 
under Katz v. United States39 and the mosaic theory as implied in United 
States v. Jones40 and Riley v. California.41 However, this Note will evaluate 
and discuss cell-site simulators through the lens of CSLI42 litigation and the 
Lambis decision;43 the latter of which held that using cell-site simulators 
requires a warrant. Additionally, the Note will incorporate established 
Fourth Amendment frameworks in analyzing the various litigation.44 The 
Lambis decision, even though it was adjudicated in federal court, is 
important here because it establishes proper legal context to evaluate cell-
site simulator use and why it requires a warrant, as apposite cases at the state 
level are practically nonexistent most likely due to the nondisclosure 
agreements.45  
A. Comparing CSLI and Cell-Site Simulators 
Cell-site simulators are best analyzed under the existing legal precedent 
                                                
38.  Ali Winston, NYPD Attempts to Block Surveillance Transparency Law with 
Misinformation, THE INTERCEPT (July 7, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/07/07/nypd-
surveillance-post-act-lies-misinformation-transparency/; What is New York City Council, and How 
Does It Work?, NYC COUNCILMATIC, https://nyc.councilmatic.org/about/.  
39.  389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). 
40.  565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012).  
41.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 n.1 (2014). 
42.  CSLI indicates which cell tower the phone’s antenna connects to so that it can access the 
cellular network. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and 
Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9–10 (2013) (statement of Mark 
Eckenwiler, Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP). If the user moves from one coverage area of a tower 
to another, the call could be “seamlessly ‘handed off’” to one or more towers in sequence. Id. 
Depending on whether the phone was connected to a cell tower in an urban, suburban, or rural 
network, the coverage area of the tower varies, affecting how precisely the phone’s location could be 
traced. Id.  
43.  United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
44.  For a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of cell-site simulators, see generally W. Scott 
Kim, The Fourth Amendment Implications on the Real-Time Tracking of Cell Phones Through the Use 
of “Stingrays,” 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 995 (2016). 
45.  See supra Section II.a. (discussing efforts by federal agencies to mandate that state and 
local agencies remain in total secrecy regarding their use of cell-site simulators). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/9
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through CSLI litigation. This is primarily because not many lawsuits exist 
that specifically address the simulators. Additionally, the similarities and 
differences between the two facilitate the discussion on how the current 
trend of not requiring warrants for CSLIs bolsters the argument that cell-
site simulators do require warrants.  
Before analyzing legal precedent, it is worthwhile to compare the two 
types of data collection. Both CSLI and information collected from cell-site 
simulators take advantage of the ubiquitous nature of cell phones to assist 
law enforcement efforts and both have presented legal issues recently.46 
Both have been used by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies47 
to obtain information on a suspect of a crime, such as location history, using 
the suspect’s cell phone. However, this is where the similarities end.  
The differences are stark in contrast. To obtain CSLI, the government 
requires the assistance of the suspect’s cell phone service provider, such as 
Verizon, to provide the information.48 Cell-site simulators, however, are 
devices that are purchased directly by the law enforcement agencies and 
function by extracting information directly from cell phones that connect to 
                                                
46.  The issue with warrants and CSLI surfaced in August 2005 when a New York Magistrate 
Judge publicly denied the government’s request for such information due to lack of proof of probable 
cause. Cell Tracking, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/cell-tracking 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2017). Although the first case that dealt with a primitive version of a cell-site 
simulator was in 1995, the technology became more well-known because of United States v. 
Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012). In that case, the defendant was convicted based on 
evidence that was later revealed to have been acquired by a cell-site simulator. Have There Been Any 
Major Court Decisions About Cell-Site Simulators?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq#faq-Have-there-been-any-major-court-decisions-
about-cell-site-simulators?- (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). The government did not disclose how it 
obtained information to prosecute Rigmaiden. For more information on how Rigmaiden uncovered the 
government’s cell-site simulator usage, see Cale Guthrie Weissman, How an Obsessive Recluse Blew 
the Lid Off the Secret Technology Authorities Use to Spy on People’s Cellphones, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Jun. 19, 2015, 5:04 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingray-
spying-technology-2015-6.  
47.  For information on how various federal, state, and local agencies have used CSLI to assist 
their law enforcement efforts, see generally Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where 
a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-
tracking/400775/ (noting that in 2014, AT&T received over 64,000 requests for CSLI, and Verizon 
received more than 21,000 requests for CSLI in the first six months of 2015).  
48.  Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-
phone-location-tracking-laws-state?iframe=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). Note that because the nature 
of CSLI involves a service provider as a “third party,” four circuit courts have held that a warrant is 
not required to obtain CSLI due to the third-party doctrine. See In re Application of U.S. for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013), United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–89 
(6th Cir. 2016), United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015), United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016). The third-party doctrine is further discussed infra Section 
III.b.  
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them, eliminating the need for service providers.49 More importantly, CSLI 
requires the government to target a specific individual as the information 
provided by the servicers are limited in scope to that user’s phone.50 On the 
other hand, cell-site simulators collect information indiscriminately within 
a target range.51 The simulators do not focus on a specific phone, but instead 
gather information by tricking all of the phones within an area to connect 
with them rather than the cell towers.52  
Moreover, CSLI supplied by third-party service providers consists of a 
history of the phone’s location.53 In comparison, cell-site simulators are able 
to not only provide the location history, but can also pinpoint the location 
of the phone with enough accuracy for officials to locate the user.54 This 
difference is especially significant because some state or local agencies, 
while obtaining a warrant for cell-site simulators, may mislead the court by 
making them appear to be pen registers55 instead.56 It has been found that at 
least one local law enforcement has used the state pen register statute to 
obtain court orders to use cell-site simulators.57 Because the orders require 
                                                
49.  See Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Cell-Site Simulators, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/04/04/applying-the-fourth-amendment-to-cell-site-
simulators/?utm_term=.c9655c776a44.  
50.  See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013) (quoting expert testimony that CSLI is one 
of two primary methods to track mobile devices).  
51.  NYCLU, supra note 8. 
52.  Id.  
53.  See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (describing CSLI as 
“the records of the phone company that identify which cell towers it used to route Defendants’ calls 
and messages”); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 141 (2012). 
54.  Kerr, supra note 49 (discussing how the officials in State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016), were able to locate the defendant at his apartment using cell-site 
simulator).  
55.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12. 
56.  In Andrews, 134 A.3d at 324, the government obtained a pen register warrant and used a 
pen register to identify the defendant’s cell phone number and later used a cell-site simulator to locate 
him. After holding that using a cell-site simulator constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, the 
Maryland Special Court of Appeals further held that the state pen register statute does not include the 
usage of cell-site simulators as “federal law specifies that the federal equivalent to the Maryland pen 
register statute does not authorize location information.” Id. at 356. See also Jason Tashea, Police Face 
Constitutional Challenges for Using Cellphone Tracking Devices to Locate Suspects, ABA JOURNAL 
(July 1, 2016, 2:50 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/police_face_constitutional_challenges_for_using_cellpho
ne_tracking_devices.  
57.  Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in 
Thousands of Cases, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 9, 2015, 6:42 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-
story.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/9
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a lower burden of proof than traditional warrants, and due to a lack of public 
knowledge on cell-site simulators, a defense attorney commented that the 
law enforcement agencies were basically “duping these judges into signing 
authorizations to use stingrays.”58 Pen register orders require a lower burden 
of proof than warrants because pen registers invade one’s privacy on a much 
lower scale than CSLI or cell-site simulators: they only collect numbers 
dialed from a specific phone.59  
B. Current Litigation on CSLI and Why the Cases Indicate that Cell-Site 
Simulator Usage Must Require Warrants 
Federal and state courts have generally held that obtaining CSLI does not 
invoke Fourth Amendment protections, and thus warrants are not required. 
This, however, may change soon as the United States Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari to review a Sixth Circuit case that held warrants 
are not required in order to obtain CSLI, scheduled for the October 2017 
term.60  
In United States v. Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the government did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search when it 
obtained CSLI because the information constituted business records.61 The 
court also made three propositions that are particularly relevant in 
contrasting CSLI against cell-site simulators: 1) CSLI cannot be evaluated 
under Jones, where the court said in dicta that “GPS monitoring in 
government investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy,” because CSLI could not provide an accurate location; 62  2) a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz could not be found here 
because the CSLI records were held by a third party—the mobile service 
provider—as business records; and 3) the third-party doctrine under Miller63 
                                                
58.  Id. 
59.  See infra Section III.c. (detailed discussion on pen registers and its comparison with cell-
site simulators). 
60.  See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 WL 
2407484 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). See also Amy Howe, Justices to Tackle Cellphone Data 
Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/justices-
tackle-cellphone-data-case-next-term/ (discussing how the Justices’ views on business records may 
have changed because these types of data are stored on cellphones, which “are now such a pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).  
61.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887–90.  
62.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)).  
63.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court in Miller held that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist for bank records because they were held by the bank as 
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applied for CSLI.64  
The first rationale behind the Carpenter decision was that CSLI could 
not be evaluated under Jones because CSLI could not pinpoint the exact 
location of the user.65 This relates to the most evident difference between 
CSLI and information obtained by cell-site simulators: cell-site simulators 
have the capability of not only extracting the location history of a cell phone, 
but can also locate the phone in real time using GPS.66 Under this rationale, 
using cell-site simulators would absolutely violate Fourth Amendment 
rights because they have the capability to direct law enforcement officials 
to a precise location.67 This concern was articulated in Carpenter, which 
stated that accurate GPS tracking “might tell a story of trips to ‘the strip 
club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on’” 
because it could pinpoint an individual’s location to a specific building.68  
The second rationale in Carpenter was that the user could not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because CSLI qualified as business 
records held by a third party.69 The business records defense cannot hold 
true for cell-site simulators because using the simulators eliminates the need 
for obtaining a set of records from the service provider. This difference also 
points to why the third-party doctrine,70 which served as the last rationale 
of the Carpenter decision, does not apply to cell-site simulators. By using 
the devices, the law enforcement agencies cut out the “third party” and 
acquire information directly. 71  Additionally, courts have ruled that 
customers do not actively share location information—or any other 
                                                
business records, and the government was able to obtain the records through a third party rather than 
directly from the defendant. Id.  
64.  Id. at 888–89.  
65.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) 
(discussing its commentary against GPS monitoring)).  
66.  Kerr, supra note 54 (discussing how the officials in State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2016), could locate the defendant at his apartment using a cell-site simulator). 
67.  Compare Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889 (classifying location history as a business record and 
contrasting it with GPS information, which can locate a target within fifty feet of accuracy), with 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing GPS monitoring and its 
impingement on reasonable expectations of privacy if information not obtained lawfully).  
68.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, 565 
U.S. at 415).  
69.  Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887.  
70.  See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). The Supreme Court held in 
Smith that installation and use of a pen register does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 
745–46. This was one of first cases to apply the third-party doctrine, which states that there is no valid 
expectation of privacy once the customer provides the information to a third party. Id. at 743–44.  
71.  See generally supra Section III.0. 
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information, for that matter—when they connect to a cell tower.72  
The third-party doctrine was also the driving reason behind the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Graham.73 The court held that cell 
phone users do not have Fourth Amendment protections over their CSLI 
because the third-party doctrine still applies when the information is 
“‘revealed’ to a third party . . . ‘on the assumption that it will be used only 
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not 
be betrayed.’”74 Yet the court hinted at the diminishing relevance of this 
doctrine.75  
Nonetheless, the court in Graham specified that CSLI falls directly under 
the ambit of the third-party doctrine because, by connecting to a cell tower 
to utilize cell phone services, the users “convey” their location to their 
providers whenever they connect to the network. 76  Conversely, this 
rationale cannot be applied to cell-site simulator data because the 
connection between users and providers are interrupted by the device. 
Rather than conveying the information voluntarily, the users are tricked into 
connecting with the device, which then forces their phones to give up 
personal information.77  
The defendants in Graham also unsuccessfully argued that CSLI 
deserves Fourth Amendment protections.78 Defendants claimed that CSLI 
is analogous to the contents of letters and calls that are already protected by 
legal precedent.79 However, the court disagreed, noting that CSLI is more 
similar to mailing addresses and phone numbers.80 Comparison to content 
written on letters and information written in envelopes is a historical 
analogy used in the Fourth Amendment context,81 and the Graham opinion 
divided such types of information into “content” and “non-content” 
respectively.82 Information under “content” would include anything that 
                                                
72.  United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing State v. 
Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 398 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) and In re Application for Pen Register & 
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).  
73.  824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2016). 
74.  Graham, 824 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
75.  “The Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine. 
Congress may act to require a warrant for CSLI. But without a change in controlling law, we cannot 
conclude that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.” Id. at 425. 
76.  Id. at 429.  
77.  See Biddle, supra note 1.  
78.  Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id.  
81.  See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
82.  Graham, 824 F.3d at 433–34. 
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reveals information contained within communications, such as the letter 
itself. In Katz,83 the Supreme Court held that the contents of phone calls are 
protected, and the Sixth Circuit held that the contents of e-mails are 
protected in Warshak under the same rationale.84 The Graham court also 
noted that there are cases expressly withholding Fourth Amendment 
protection only from “non-content” information, 85  such as the mailing 
address found on the envelope,86 phone numbers that were dialed,87 and 
information in the “to” and “from” fields found in emails.88 
Applying the same rationale, if CSLI is classified as “non-content” 
information because it “facilitate[s] personal communications rather than 
[representing] part of the content of the communications themselves,”89 it 
would be difficult to argue that information obtained from cell-site 
simulators belongs in the same category. Although both types of 
information reveal location, cell-site simulators provide real-time location 
data, which the Jones concurrence described as impinging upon Fourth 
Amendment rights and reasonable expectations of privacy.90 Additionally, 
as previously noted, cell-site simulators can also acquire contents of calls 
and texts,91 which definitely reveal the actual contents of communication. 
Even if the law enforcement officials claim that cell-site simulators are only 
used to locate someone, that in and of itself already constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search under Jones.92  
III. WHY UNITED STATES V. LAMBIS MATTERS  
While litigation regarding cell-site simulators has been scarce, likely due 
to federal agencies subjecting state and local law enforcement officials to 
nondisclosure agreements and directing them to settle cases to prevent 
exposure,93 the Southern District Court of New York recently held that cell-
                                                
83.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
84.  United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2010). 
85.  Graham, 824 F.3d at 432.  
86.  Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
87.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).  
88.  See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). See also United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that Fourth Amendment 
protections do not extend to phone numbers disclosed to phone companies and email addresses 
disclosed to internet service providers).  
89.  Graham, 824 F.3d at 433.  
90.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 430. 
91.  See Pell & Soghoian, at 144–46 n.10. 
92.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430. Since real-time location would be used, classifications of 
“content” and “non-content” would be irrelevant here.  
93.  See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, supra note 21. The FBI 
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site simulators require a warrant in an opinion providing a much-needed, 
detailed insight into a court’s perspective on this issue.94  
A. Introduction of the Case 
In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sought a warrant 
for the usage of a pen register and CSLI to aid in investigating an 
international drug-trafficking organization.95  After obtaining the warrant 
and using CSLI, the DEA agents were able to narrow the location of Lambis, 
the suspect, to a specific intersection in Manhattan, but CSLI was not 
precise enough to provide the exact building.96 To pinpoint the suspect’s 
location, the DEA agents used a cell-site simulator to locate the building 
with the strongest “ping,” which is a signal that cell phones typically 
transmit when they connect to a cell tower.97 The strength of the “pings” 
coming from the suspect’s phone was calculated by the cell-site simulator 
that forced all phones within the area to connect to it.98 Through this process, 
the DEA agents were able to locate the building where the target phone was; 
then, the technician walked the halls of the building, utilizing the cell-site 
simulator, until he located the apartment unit with the strongest signal.99  
After locating the unit, the agents obtained consent from the suspect’s 
father to enter, obtained consent from the suspect to search his bedroom, 
and acquired evidence that included drug paraphernalia.100 Lambis filed a 
motion to suppress this evidence.101  
                                                
stated that there has been a misunderstanding behind the purposes of nondisclosure agreements, as 
their intentions were “‘to protect the disclosure of sensitive information regarding the tradecraft and 
capabilities of the device.’” Jemal Brinson, Cell Site Simulators: How Law Enforcement Can Track 
You, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 18, 2016, 12:21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/plus/ct-
cellphone-tracking-devices-20160129-htmlstory.html. However, the FBI cannot limit information such 
as whether the device had been used to pursue an individual, as a criminal defendant would have a 
right to know. Id. Additionally, there now is no merit in claiming that disclosure of cell-site simulator 
use would compromise an agency’s ability to carry out its efforts to combat criminals and terrorists, 
because the only likely countermeasure of interfering with such efforts would be by turning off their 
phones. See Biddle, supra note 1. 
94.  United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
95.  Id. at 608.  
96.  Id. at 609.  
97.  Id.  
98.  Id.  
99.  Id.  
100.  Id.  
101.  Id.  
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B. Analysis by the Court in Lambis 
The district court began with a discussion on what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search, which will not be explored in depth here.102 However, 
the court’s rejection of the exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections is 
relevant and warrants discussion. 
After concluding that the government’s conduct did constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search, the court rejected both the attenuation doctrine and the 
third-party doctrine as valid exceptions to the warrantless search of 
Lambis’s bedroom. 103  The attenuation doctrine deems evidence as 
admissible if the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct 
and the evidence is “remote or has been interrupted by some intervening 
circumstance.”104 The government argued that, because they were able to 
obtain consent from Lambis’s father and Lambis himself to search the 
apartment, the doctrine is applicable and thus evidence should not be 
suppressed.105  
The attenuation doctrine is not particularly instructive on cell-site 
simulator use and will not be discussed further. The Lambis decision 
ultimately concluded that searches resulting from information obtained by 
such devices will not produce admissible evidence simply because the 
person eventually consents to a physical search.106  
The court also struck down the third-party doctrine as a valid exception. 
The relevance of this doctrine has been decreasing in the ever-changing 
world of technology. In modern times, it is “nearly impossible to avoid 
disclosing the most personal of information to third-party service providers 
on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life.” 107  In Jones, Justice 
Sotomayor expressed the decreasing relevance of the third-party doctrine as 
                                                
102.  Id. at 609–10. Broadly, the court used Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), to 
discuss reasonable expectations of privacy and how the home especially deserves Fourth Amendment 
protections because of the right of a person to retreat into his or her own home and be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d, at 609–10. Kyllo held a Fourth 
Amendment search had occurred when the government used a thermal imaging device to detect 
infrared radiation that was emanating from a home. Id. The main reason behind this holding was that 
the government used a device that was “not in general public use to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 
40). Analogous to Kyllo, the government here was able to obtain information that could not have been 
obtained by the general public. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d, at 609–10.  
103.  Id. at 612–16.  
104.  Id. at 612 (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)). 
105.  Id.  
106.  Id. at 613–14.  
107.  United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015).  
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it is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.” 108  Notably, this doctrine has been used by courts in 
generally allowing for warrantless searches to obtain pen register 
information and CSLI.109  
Unlike CSLI, the government cannot assert the third-party doctrine as an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment in order to use cell-site simulators. Pen 
registers record phone numbers that are dialed by the customer, and the 
information is essentially initiated by the user because he or she “voluntarily” 
gives it up each time to make a phone call. However, courts have held that 
users do not voluntarily give up information concerning their phones simply 
by turning the devices on and having them connect to a cell tower.110 These 
“pings” are automatically sent by the phone once it is powered on, and the 
user plays no active role in this process.111 Instead, the cell tower, or the 
cell-site simulator, forces the phones to connect with it to provide network 
support.112 In the case of cell-site simulators, agencies are able to locate and 
pinpoint a targeted phone by forcing the phone to connect to the simulators, 
having the phone repeatedly transmit its identifying number, and then 
calculating the strength of the “ping” until the phone’s location is found.113  
Whether CSLI is voluntarily given is a contested topic, but the fact that 
pen registers and CSLI require a third party is not.114 The crux of the third-
party doctrine is that once a customer provides information voluntarily to a 
third party, he or she cannot be said to hold a reasonable expectation of 
                                                
108.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
109.  Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 613–16. Whether the third-party doctrine should be struck 
down in its entirety, with particular regard to CSLI, is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be 
discussed in detail. But it is important to emphasize the disparity between technology that existed at 
the time when the third-party doctrine emerged and now. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 744–45 (1979) (discussing pen registers, which recorded all the numbers dialed from a 
telephone); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists for bank account holders in their bank records since they are business records).  
110.  See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 615 (discussing a line of cases: In re Application of U.S. 
for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 
317 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with 
a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014); State v. 
Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013)). Although other courts have ruled that CSLI does fall outside of 
Fourth Amendment protections because of the third-party doctrine, the stronger rationale behind such 
ruling is that CSLI involves a third party, beyond the issue of whether a user actively provides 
information to a third party when it connects to a tower. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 616.  
111.  Id.  
112.  Id. (discussing State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350, 359 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016)).  
113.  Id.  
114.  Id. at 617.  
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privacy.115 Unlike Carpenter or Graham,116 the government cannot assert 
that cell-site simulators obtain information maintained as business records, 
or that phone users concede a reasonable expectation of privacy by simply 
turning on their phones. Because the government cuts out the third party by 
directly using the cell-site simulators, the third-party doctrine cannot 
absolve the need for warrants.  
C. Shortfalls and Concerns: What the Lambis Decision Fails to Address 
Although the Lambis decision eliminates arguments that law 
enforcement agencies could make to justify their warrantless usage of cell-
site simulators, there are certain shortfalls that need to be addressed. Based 
on Lambis, the government cannot assert that: 1) using a cell-site simulator 
usage does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections, 2) subsequent 
searches could produce admissible evidence even with consent, and 3) the 
attenuation or third-party doctrine excuse their misconduct.117 However, 
courts have not addressed the concerns of privacy advocates who fear that 
agencies can obtain warrants without disclosing their use of cell-site 
simulators.118 Furthermore, even if a request for a warrant may indicate the 
intended use of the simulators, it may not accurately portray their 
capabilities or the type of information that they intend to collect. Given the 
lack of knowledge and awareness on this topic, judges could be inclined to 
grant warrants without realizing that cell-site simulators are not only 
capable of tracking location history, but could also track a phone in real-
time and even record calls.119 This, combined with the efforts by federal 
agencies to keep information regarding cell-site simulators hidden, raises 
concerns that even if warrants are sought, the actual usage of cell-site 
simulators may exceed what the court initially had in mind when it granted 
the warrant.  
Moreover, within the specific context of New York law, there is support 
                                                
115.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties”); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (a bank depositor has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to banks in the ordinary course 
of business).  
116.  See supra Section III.b.  
117.  See supra Section IV.b. 
118.  See supra note 56.  
119.  See Dell Cameron & Patrick Howell O'Neill, Police Documents Reveal How Law 
Enforcement Keep Stingray Use Secret, THE DAILY DOT (Oct. 7, 2016 6:58 AM), 
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/stingray-surveillance-doj-warrant-north-carolina/. See also Pell & 
Soghoian, supra note 10, at 144–46.  
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that an eavesdropping warrant, which is a type of warrant with heightened 
privacy protections, should be required for cell-site simulators. 120  This 
would require law enforcement officials to “demonstrate probable cause of 
unlawful activity before a surveillance warrant will issue” while being 
subjected to “procedures for minimizing intrusions on privacy” when using 
the cell-site simulators. 121  Currently, New York law explicitly covers 
surveillance methods such as pen registers and “trap and trace” devices.122 
While the law includes language that could apply to cell-site simulators, 
there has been a lack of support indicating that such devices fall directly 
under the ambit of New York’s eavesdropping law.123  
Additionally, the Lambis decision only concerns federal agents, who 
may already have been implicated by the DOJ’s policy on cell-site 
simulators.124 Because of the varying jurisdictions of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement, the Lambis decision is limited in effect in that DEA agents 
could now claim that they are acting in accordance with the DOJ’s newly 
issued policy, while state and local agencies may continue their cell-site 
simulator usage without any consequences. To effectively monitor cell-site 
usage by all law enforcement officials at any level, legislation amending 
current New York state law is necessary and required. 
                                                
120.  Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New York, NYCLU (Aug. 
2015), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/memo_stingrayuse_NY_201508_final.pdf.  
121.  Legislative Memo: In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays, NYCLU 
(Aug. 2015), https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/support-warrant-requirement-use-stingrays.  
122.  “Trap and trace” devices, which also have been inaccurately used interchangeably with 
cell-site simulators by agencies, display the originating number of a phone. See NYCLU, supra note 
120 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 705.00(2), which describes trap and trace devices “as devices 
that identify the originating number”). 
123.  The nature of cell-site simulators requires more effort to make the eavesdropping law 
directly applicable. See NYCLU, supra note 120. The eavesdropping laws criminalize “unlawfully . . . 
intercepting or accessing . . . an electronic communication.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05. But legal 
exceptions, such as an exception for wiretapping, provided by the laws could also make the cell-site 
simulators escape the grasp of New York’s penal laws. NYCLU, supra note 120 (obtaining 
“telephonic or telegraphic communication,” defined as “any aural transfer” made through wire, cable, 
or other similar facilities, is exempt because it is separately covered by wiretapping statutes—however, 
wiretapping nonetheless requires a warrant). Another exception also includes signals from a “tracking 
device consisting of an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of 
a person or object.” Id. This exception covers any tracking devices, for which cell-site simulators 
could qualify. Id. Even if the devices qualify for this exception, the usage would still require warrants 
under People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 447 (N.Y. 2009). Id. 
124.  See Benjamin Weiser, D.E.A. Needed Warrant to Track Suspect’s Phone, Judge Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/nyregion/dea-needed-warrant-to-track-
suspects-phone-judge-says.html.  
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IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
An order by a Northern District of Illinois judge is particularly 
instructive on what a bill should look like in order to restrict use of cell-site 
simulators and to require warrants.125 In this opinion, the court outlined 
specific guidelines for law enforcement officers when utilizing cell-site 
simulators: 1) they “must make reasonable efforts to minimize the capture 
of signals emitted from cell phones used by people other than the target of 
the investigation;” 2) they “must immediately destroy all data other than the 
data identifying the cell phone used by the target[, and t]he destruction must 
occur within forty-eight hours after the data is captured;” and 3) the officers 
are “prohibited from using any data acquired beyond that necessary to 
determine the cell phone information of the target.”126  
The second prong of the court’s suggestion, instructing destruction of all 
data other than the data identifying the cell phone used by the target, is 
particularly important given the privacy interests at stake. On the federal 
level, the DHS policy includes a “Data Collection and Disposal” section that 
lists practices such as deleting all data immediately following the 
completion of a mission, deleting data as soon as the target is located, and 
making sure that the equipment does not have any data stored from previous 
use prior to using it for a different mission.127 However, this does not ensure 
the same for state and local officials who also utilize cell-site simulators.  
It is especially concerning that, after multiple requests by the NYCLU 
for information on cell-site simulator use, the New York State Police 
indicated that it had no records of relevant policy documents while 
continuing to purchase upgrades to improve cell-site simulator 
capabilities.128  Essentially due to the nondisclosure agreements between 
local officials and the FBI, information is kept well-hidden regarding cell-
site simulator use on the state and local level.129 This implies that currently 
there is no way of determining whether New York state and local officials 
have implemented any policy to destroy data acquired by cell-site 
simulators, especially those of innocent bystanders who happen to be in the 
same area as a suspect of a crime.130 The proposed bill must explicitly 
                                                
125.  In re Application of U.S. for an Order Relating to Telephones Used by Suppressed, No. 15 
M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015). 
126.  Id. at *3–4.  
127.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 4.  
128.  NYCLU, supra note 8. 
129.  Id.  
130.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation has explained why those individuals not targeted by 
criminal investigations should still be concerned: “[I]f you[ a]re in the area where the police are using 
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mandate enforcement officials to destroy all collected data that is irrelevant 
to the investigation at hand and eventually all data after the suspect has been 
located.  
However, note that the guidelines established by the Northern District of 
Illinois’s decision only come into play after assuming that cell-site simulator 
usage initially requires a warrant.131 The need to prove probable cause to 
obtain a warrant cannot be viewed as an “undue burden” placed on law 
enforcement 132  because of the capabilities of cell-site simulators 133  and 
privacy interests that are subsequently implicated. Because New York state 
and local officials currently engage in cell-site simulator usage without any 
legal oversight or even internal policies, a requirement of a warrant is 
necessary to protect the public from unreasonable intrusions on privacy.134 
A. Legislative Example: California’s “CalECPA” 
In contrast to New York’s policies, or lack thereof, California has been 
praised for having the most “forward-thinking” state privacy laws. 135 
According to the ACLU, California state and local enforcement agencies 
have been using cell-site simulators in a similar manner to agencies in New 
York.136 However, California’s lawmaking authority took quite a drastic 
approach compared to New York. In 2015, California passed legislation, 
known as the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(CalECPA), that strengthened the state’s privacy laws and required, among 
other things, state and local agencies to obtain a warrant prior to using cell-
                                                
a cell-site simulator, your phone information would be captured as well—even though you may have 
absolutely no connection to the person or people who are the target of the search. Yet as one court 
opinion pointed out, applications for orders allowing the use of this technology seldom ‘address what 
the government would do with the cell phone numbers and other information concerning seemingly 
innocent cell phone users whose information was recorded by the equipment.’” If I’m Not a Target of 
a Criminal Investigation, Why Do I Have to Worry About Cell-Site Simulators?, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq#faq-If-I’m-not-a-target-
of-a-criminal-investigation,-why-do-I-have-to-worry-about-cell-site-simulators? (last visited Jan. 15, 
2017).  
131.  In re Application of U.S. for an Order Relating to Telephones Used by Suppressed, 2015 
WL 6871289 at *1 (discussing how the matter came about after the government applied for a warrant 
for usage of cell-site simulators).  
132.  See Ada Danelo, Note, Legislative Solutions to Stingray Use: Regulating Cell Site 
Simulator Technology Post-Riley, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1355, 1391 (2016). 
133.  See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 10.  
134.  NYCLU, supra note 121.  
135.  Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 
2015, 9:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/.  
136.  Stingray Tracking Devices: Who's Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-
tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).  
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site simulators.137 CalECPA broadly prohibits any governmental entities 
from obtaining any type of digital data, including metadata, location data, 
emails, and text messages, unless they obtain a warrant.138  In addition, 
California recently passed another law that requires all agencies that use 
cell-site simulators to create specific policies regarding their use and to post 
them “conspicuously” on their websites.139 
Ultimately, the New York state legislature is in the best position to 
ensure that state and local law enforcement officials request and obtain 
warrants before using cell-site simulators. Given the persistent efforts by 
NYCLU and the court’s decision in Lambis, the New York legislature must 
now acknowledge that not only are cell-site simulators being frequently 
used, but that such unrestrained usage violates privacy rights.  
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that cell-site simulators have been used by law 
enforcement officials throughout the country, and especially in the state of 
New York. Although public knowledge of cell-site simulator use may have 
contributed to the publication of cell-site simulator policies by the DOJ and 
DHS,140 the full impact of these devices has yet to be felt by a majority of 
the states. Moreover, a nondisclosure agreement between the FBI and the 
Erie County Sheriff’s Office reveals even more troubling facts—that the 
Sheriff’s Office is to maintain total secrecy on its cell-site simulator use, 
even in court filings and responding to court orders, and that it should seek 
dismissal of a criminal prosecution if it would entail disclosing 
“compromising” information on cell-site simulators.141 This not only raises 
the issue of why cell-site simulators are shrouded in such secrecy, but also 
whether the New York state and local officials should continue to engage in 
cell-site simulator use without any legal restrictions or requirements.  
                                                
137.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (West 2017). Specifically, the statute prohibits government 
entities from doing the following unless they obtain a warrant, court order, or a subpoena: (1) 
compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service 
provider; (2) compelling the production of or access to electronic device information from any person 
or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device; or (3) accessing electronic device 
information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. 
This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily 
disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government 
entity. Id.  
138.  California Rejects Warrantless Surveillance, Enacts “CalECPA,” ELECTRONIC PRIVACY 
INFORMATION CENTER (Oct. 9, 2015), https://epic.org/2015/10/california-rejects-warrantless.html.  
139.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53166 (West 2016).  
140.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
141.  NYCLU, supra note 8. 
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Efforts to keep cell-site simulator usage from public view have resulted 
in few adjudicated cases, but Lambis allowed both the public and law 
enforcement agencies to get a glimpse of how the court would rule, although 
policies issued by federal agencies already govern federal cell-site simulator 
usage to a large extent.142 Specifically, the Lambis decision rejected the 
third-party doctrine, noting that cell-site simulators allow the government 
to directly obtain any information sought from the targeted individual and 
his or her cell phone, eliminating any involvement by a third party. 
Additionally, CSLI litigation has also shed light on how courts evaluate 
these types of information and how cell phone data is acquired and used by 
law enforcement agencies. The clear differences that distinguish CSLI from 
information obtained by cell-site simulators show that such exceptions 
would not hold true for cell-site simulators. The trend among circuit courts 
is that a warrant is generally not required for CSLI because it is stored by a 
service provider. Since a third party stores such records, CSLI can be further 
classified as business records and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment 
due to the third-party doctrine. Furthermore, CSLI is “non-content” 
information, similar to the mailing addresses found on envelopes, thus 
government agencies do not conduct a search when they obtain CSLI.  
Although numerous bills have been introduced by New York lawmakers 
to combat the issue of unrestricted usage of cell-site simulators, none of 
them have been made into law. Failed bills that have been proposed in the 
last two years indicate that even though there is support by privacy 
advocates and private companies, 143  there is a lack of support at the 
legislative level. The lack of transparency by New York state and local law 
enforcement officials regarding their use of cell-site simulators should be a 
source of concern not only for privacy law experts, but also for anyone who 
lives within the state and uses a cell phone. With the amount of information 
currently available, largely due to NYCLU’s research and efforts, the 
informed public can play a vital role in petitioning their legislators to ensure 
that a future bill mandating warrants for cell-site simulator use would pass. 
In addition, the proposed legislation should also require any governmental 
agencies utilizing a cell-site simulator to minimize the capturing of data 
from anyone else but the target, take immediate measures to destroy any 
other acquired data besides those from the target, and limit the use of 
information to what is absolutely necessary to locate the target.144 
                                                
142.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
143.  NYCLU, supra note 33. 
144.  See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Relating to Telephones Used by Suppressed, 
No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015). See also supra Part IV. 
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Evidence acquired by civil rights groups amounts to a conclusion that 
law enforcement agencies have, for years, attempted to cover their cell-site 
simulator usage in secrecy. While their efforts to combat crimes should be 
recognized and respected, it does not mean that the privacy rights of 
ordinary citizens should be compromised without any limitations. It is time 
to require the legislature to act.  
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